Who will speak for Europe once the Constitutional Treaty is ratified? David Allen d.j.allen@lboro.ac.uk Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies Loughborough University, UK EUSA Biennial Conference, Austin Texas, March 2005 Panel 4D: The Constitutionalization of ESDP: European and US Perspectives Texas BallroomV Draft: please do not cite without permission Who will speak for Europe once the Constitutional Treaty is ratified? David Allen Observers of EU external policy have much to speculate upon following agreement amongst the EU member states on a new Constitutional Treaty. In the two years that it will probably take to try and get the Treaty ratified by all the current 25 member states there will be much discussion about how the new arrangements for the development and implementation of the EU's external policies will work in practice (For an excellent recent overview see Grevi, Manca and Quille, 2005). If the Treaty is ratified then the EU will be given a legal identity for the first time and the outside world will at least be spared the nonsense of having to sign agreements with the 'European Community and its Member States'. Ratification will see the eventual election of a President of the European Council who will undertake 'at his or her level' to ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs' (Article 1-21). The last sentence above refers to the fact that the President will preside over a European Council consisting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, the President of the European Commission and the newly established Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (referred to hereafter as the European Foreign Minister), who the Treaty stipulates will 'take part' in the work of the European Council. Although the identity of the first elected President of the European Council will remain unknown probably until 2009, we already know that Javier Solana, the current Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers and High Representative for the CFSP will be the first European Foreign Minister. In the summer of 2004 he was reappointed for another term in his present role until the new Treaty is ratified and, once, or rather if, that occurs, to then take up the post of European Foreign Minister. There is already a possible conflict, or at least confusion, of external roles between the President of the European Council and the European Foreign Minister. Solana will have a head start but much will then depend on how his administrative support shapes up and what sort of support is provided for the President of the European Council. At present it is not that clear what the President of the European Council will do for the 357 days of the year that the European Council is not meeting (assuming an average of 4 meetings a year) other than 'represent the Union at his or her level'. As we shall see the Treaty envisages that Solana will have a bureaucratic apparatus bearing some resemblance to a European Foreign Ministry to support him in his extensive responsibilities in both the Council and the Commission but what sort of support will be provided for the President of the Council given his own representational role? Both of them, of course, will continue to have to relate to a Commission President who will also presumably aspire to play his or her role in the external representation of the Union (even though he or she is not given a specific external role in the new Treaty). Already it seems as if external 'coherence' will remain a challenge for the Union and its external partners. The European Foreign Minister will chair the Foreign Affairs Council and this will mean that one source of incoherence in external policy should be removed as the rotating Presidency will disappear for all aspects of external relations. The logic of this decision means that officials working to the European Foreign Minister will chair the meetings of the Political and Security Committee as well as the numerous working groups that feed into the CFSP/ESDP process (but not presumably COREPER when it is considering external relations agenda items?). However the European Foreign Minister is also to be a Vice President of the European Commission responsible for all those aspects of external relations that fall within the Commission's responsibilities. The European Foreign Minister will therefore effectively combine the current roles occupied by Javier Solana and Benita Ferrara-Waldner except that one reading of the new arrangements would suggest that hewill have greater coordinating powers/authority within the Commission in respect to the other Commissioners with external responsibilities (Trade, Development and Enlargement) than is currently enjoyed by Ferrara-Waldner. In this way the Treaty could be said to address the problem of coherence on external affairs both within the Commission and between the Commission and the Council but in so doing it is likely to give rise to considerable 'turf wars' within and between the institutions of the Union. Nevertheless there remain a number of unanswered question which raise some doubts about the clarity of the face that the EU will present to the outside world especially during what may well prove to be quite a long and confusing transitional period. Even allowing for the fact that the EU institutions have got themselves this far by proving to be both flexible and innovative, one wonders what will happen to Benita Ferrara- Waldner, the new Austrian Commissioner, who has inherited Mr Pattens RELEX portfolio, once the Treaty is ratified and Mr Solana automatically takes over that portfolio. In coming into the Commission perhaps in 2007 Mr Solana will find himself potentially up against Commissioners Louis Michel (Development), Olli Rehn (Enlargement) and Peter Mandelson (Trade) who will have been in post for several years and who will probably not have become accustomed to being 'coordinated ' by the RELEX Commissioner. Furthermore one also wonders about the fate of the new Spanish Commissioner, Joauquin Almunia (Economic and Monetary portfolio) who will be presumably pushed out by the arrival of Solana in the Commission. To date the Barroso Commission has not made much progress in anticipation of the new arrangements for the management of external relations that would follow the ratification of the Treaty. Back in February 2004 there were suggestions (Cronin 2004) that the next RELEX Commissioner would be given the status of a vice-president of the Commission in order to prepare the ground for the arrival of an EU foreign minister. The idea then was that the RELEX commissioner would coordinate the work of six other commissioners (in an expanded post- enlargement Commission) dealing with the totality of the EU's relations with the outside world. In fact the Barroso Commission has retained just four external relations Commissioners and, if anything, the role of the RELEX Commissioner has been downgraded from Patten's time with Barroso himself taking a leading role in all discussions about the future of the Commissions role in the making and implementation of EU external policy. The job of European Foreign Minister is therefore clearly going to be an extremely demanding one and much will depend on the people that Solana is able to gather around him. Others (Hill, 2003; Duke, 2004; Grevi et al, 2005) have already commented, on the need for a European Foreign Minister to have the support of something approaching a European Foreign Ministry (meaning both an headquarters staff and a network of external delegations and special envoys) if he or she is to function effectively. The Constitutional Treaty provides for an European External Action Service (EEAS) to 'assist the European Foreign Minister' but, as Duke (2004) has already pointed out, little else has been agreed about the make up or roles of the EEAS beyond the statement that its officials will be drawn from relevant (it does not say exactly which) parts of the Commission, the Council Secretariat and from the diplomatic services of the member states. It seems to be assumed that the EEAS in Brussels will certainly include Commission officials currently working within DG RELEX and might also include officials from the other external DGs (Development, Trade and Enlargement as well as EuropeAid, and ECHO) as well as members of DG (E) in the Council Secretariat, the Policy Unit, and possibly the Military Staff based in the Council. They will be joined by seconded officials (not necessarily all diplomats given the growing role of 'home' civil servants in external policy-making and implementation) but how many of these and for how long remains to be decided. The task of shaping this EEAS along guidelines to be laid down by the Council falls to the European Foreign Minister elect and, almost immediately after being nominated, Javier Solana began the controversial work of drawing up plans ready to be implemented once/if the Treaty is ratified (King, 2004). The Brussels European Council (Council of Ministers, 2004) welcomed the fact that Solana had begun work on the scope and structure of the EEAS along with the Presidency and the Commission. It invited (Council of Ministers. 2004, paragraph 71) them to prepare a joint progress report for the June 2005 European Council and it instructed them to take 'appropriate steps' to keep the European Parliament informed. The Presidency Conclusions also reflected the concerns of one or two member states about developments in this area by specifically calling for COREPER to prepare for EEAS deliberations within the GAERC and thus ensure that Solana maintains regular contact with the member states as he works on his proposals.. In practice much of the preparatory work is nevertheless being controlled by Solana and his colleagues in the Council Secretariat's Directorate General (E), headed by Robert Cooper, and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit working under the direction of Christoph Heusgen. The European Commission is in relative disarray and is consumed with the difficult task of adjusting to the participation of officials from the ten new members and the Dutch and Luxembourg Presidencies have demonstrated neither the will nor the resources for this sort of detailed planning - things may change when the British take over the Presidency from July 2005. Solana seems intent on maintaining oversight and control over what he clearly sees as his future foreign ministry/diplomatic service. To date most of the focus would seem to be on the apparatus that will be built in Brussels with less time being spent on the future composition of Union delegations in third countries. Solana is working with the Commission but with Barroso's office rather than RELEX. Solana's current aim would seem to be to create an EEAS, which, whilst including Commission, Council and national diplomatic officials, is nevertheless distinct from both the Council and the Commission. Within the Commission, and especially within RELEX, both this and the alternative of creating the EEAS within the Council structure is viewed with some foreboding although to date it is the European Parliament (in the formidable shape of Elmar Brok) that has voiced the loudest concerns about Solana's plans (European Parliament 2005). Whilst the member states want the EEAS to be firmly under the control of the Council, the larger countries might prefer a body that was slightly apart from the formal Council structure in the belief that this would enhance their own influence. A number of issues remain to be resolved before the June 2005 European Council. There is the question of the Military Staff and whether they should be included in the EEAS. There is also the question of the status of the Political and Security Committee (to be chaired by an official working to Solana) relative to COREPER, which will presumably still be chaired by the rotating Presidency. According to European Voice (Cronin, 2005) Solana and Barroso have now prepared a paper on the EEAS along the lines that Solana was proposing in December 2004 – effectively an Union diplomatic service that would be independent of both the Commission and the Council. If the EEAS is to be autonomous then this will be strongly resisted by the European Parliament. In a recent report written by Elmar Brok for the EP's Constitutional Affairs Committee it is argued that the EEAS should be within the Commission rather than in the Council or autonomous as preferred by Solana. Brok's fear is that an autonomous EEAS controlled by an European foreign minister appointed by the European Council could not be effectively scrutinised by the European Parliament. He also fears that without a major role in external policy arrangements ( the current proposals certainly significantly downplay the Commissions role in the CFSP) 'this could leave the Commission as just an 'internal market machine' (Cronin, 2005). The Solana/Barroso paper argues that because the foreign minister has a 'particular role' in conducting the CFSP and ESDP all those working on those areas within the Commission and the Council should be an integral part of the EEAS including all the military staff. This leaves open the question of the EU's Situation Centre (SITCEN) which analyses intelligence drawn from the member states and which could also be transferred from the Council to the EEAS given that the EU foreign minister will be its main client. The Solana/Barroso paper does not however envisage a complete takeover of all EU external competences by the EEAS. Whilst it is envisaged that it will have both geographical desks covering all regions and countries of the world as well as thematic desks dealing with issues such as human rights, non-proliferation counter-terror etc which should not be duplicated either in the Council or the Commission, the paper does not argue the case forgiving the EEAS trade, development, enlargement, or humanitarian assistance competences. These would presumably remain in the Commission and would be coordinated by the foreign minister wearing his RELEX hat. This proposal might go a long way to reassuring those in the Commission and Parliament who fear for the Commission's external role but they would seem to put a virtual end to the Commissions role in the CFSP/ESDP decision-making process despite the obvious importance of the civilian aspects of crisis management which are controlled by the Commission. According to European Voice (Cronin, 2005), the paper also includes a reference to an EEAS unit that would be responsible for relations with the European Parliament given its 'growing importance' in external relations. At the time of writing (March 2005) the Solana/Barroso paper was due to be considered by COREPER with a view to fully involving the member states in the final report that will be presented to the European Council. .Away from Brussels, the Commission external delegations (there are currently over 120 making the Commission the fourth largest when compared with the member state diplomatic networks) will become Union delegations (although not yet embassies). The current Commission delegations (Bruter, 2000; Bale 2002: Keukeleire, 2003)) are already doing a great deal more than overseeing EU development aid to and monitoring EU agreements with third countries. Unlike the overseas representations of the member states, the Commission delegations already provide welcome support to the EU's many special representatives and, under Patten's instruction, have also filed information reports both to the Commission and to Mr Solana's support units in the Council Secretariat. The Council of Ministers also has two external liaison offices in New York and Geneva t o handle relations with the United Nations. In other words, the EU's delegations, whose organisation and working practices have also been reformed under Patten, are probably in good shape to take on extra responsibilities as part of the EEAS. If the rotating Presidency is indeed to disappear altogether from the external relations field then the job of coordinating the CFSP work of Member State representations in third countries will now fall to the Union Delegations. There will be those who will have greater ambitions for these Union delegations especially those within the Commission who have for a long time aspired to create an all encompassing European Diplomatic Service, trained in an European Diplomatic Academy and destined eventually to replace altogether the representational roles of the Member State delegations other than for cultural matters and tourism. Needless to say the foreign ministries and diplomatic services of the Member States do not go along with this scenario and the new Treaty is quite clear that the EEAS is in no way to be seen as a replacement for national diplomatic services and overseas missions.. However in all the member states diplomatic services are under pressure both from the changing nature of diplomacy (Hocking and Spence, 2003) and from demands for financial savings from Finance Ministries ( Spinant, 2003; Blackhurst, 2004). In 2000 Javier Solana (Council 2000) made the point that the then fifteen EU member states deployed over 40,000 diplomatic staff in over 1500 diplomatic missions whereas the US deployed only 15000 staff in just under 300 missions. Solana argued tha this huge investment of human and financial resources by the EU does not produce comparable influence to that of the US and is designed more for cooperation and coordination than for significant joint action. There may well be a case for Union delegations taking on both EU and national representational roles for those member states who are not themselves represented in certain third countries. As the financial squeeze is put on all member state diplomatic services, there will be a tendency both to rely on other methods (mainly the internet) of information gathering ( Sucharipa, 2003) and a keenness to preserve, at all costs, headquarters staff who are capable of influencing the national foreign policy process at home. It may well be that in practice, if not in principle, even the grandest of member state diplomatic services may see some value in the future in handing over consular and other work to Union delegations staffed by the EEAS. Indeed is already the case that the member states have intensified consular cooperation amongst their national diplomatic services following agreement in the Council on pooling consular resources both in normal times and in times of crisis (Council, 2004, paragraph 69) However intensified cooperation between national diplomatic forces could be seen as a defence mechanism against the transfer of consular services from the national to the Community level. National diplomats are bound to worry that the growth in authority and competence of Union delegations could rapidly lead to a wave of rationalizations at national level involving both the closing of bilateral embassies in EU capitals and the skimming off of the 'brightest and the best national diplomats for the European diplomatic service (Merrit, 2004) It is clear that in some member states like Britain the new arrangements proposed in the Treaty are seen as being desirable mainly as a way for the member states in the Council to exert more control over the external activities of the European Commission in particular. In giving evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs both Jack Straw (2004), the UK Foreign Secretary and Kim Darroch, the UK FCO EU Director –General, made it clear that they see both the European Foreign Minister and the EEAS as working to the Council of Ministers primarily - thus enabling, as they see it, the member states to exert more control (and coherence?) over the external activities of the EU. Mr Straw even went as far as to suggest that at present 'you find all sorts of odd-bods from the European Union running all sorts of odd offices around the world' and that it would thus be a good thing if arrangements for the EEAS gave 'us (meaning either the Council or the UK!) more control than we have at the moment'. Despite this bravado it does seem sensible, and probably in the interests of the future of national diplomatic services, that economies of scale in EU/member state representation be achieved where possible and anything that increases the EU's coherence from an external perspective is to be welcomed. It probably is to early to anticipate the establishment of an EU Diplomatic Service by setting up an EU Diplomatic Academy, as suggested by Spanish MEP Gerardo Gelante ( but see also an earlier proposal by Jorg Monar (2000) and , but a proposal from the European Policy Centre (Cameron, 2004) for the establishment of a European Diplomatic Certificate to be taught within the member states seems like a sensible compromise. If all members of the EEAS were required to eventually study for this certificate, ideally in a country other than there own, then some useful progress towards the further 'socialization' of Europe's diplomats might be made. National diplomats are already operating effectively on an ad hoc basis in each other's foreign ministries and in the Brussels institutions and the new Treaty arrangements could usefully progress this tendency and would ideally prevent some member states from attempting to set up rival arrangements amongst themselves to counter the growing potential of the Union delegations. Everybody is aware of the considerable potential for turf wars over EU external relations within and between the Brussels institutions and between them and the member states. As Solana and his colleagues seek to make sense of the new arrangements laid down in the Constitutional Treaty he already has to contend with the renewed enthusiasm of the Big Three (Britain, France and Germany) for a foreign policy directoire. Solana may well decide that his job in the future will be easier if the Big Three are at least pulling together over Iran or over the defence arrangements rather than pulling apart as over Iraq. One of the consequences of the Iraq fiasco was that Solana was cut out of virtually all negotiations; at least over the recent agreements on ESDP and Iran he might see himself as the long-term beneficiary of Big Three activity ( it should be noted that . after being initially excluded, Solana now seems to be fully involved in the activities of the Big Three towards Iran). Solana himself seems convinced that making the post of European Foreign Minister work and creating an European External Action Service is the only way that the EU can achieve the objectives laid down in its new Security Strategy of making the EU more capable and more coherent in international affairs. Perhaps all those who are currently squaring up for a fight over the new external arrangements would do well to consult Europe's partners as to who they believe 'speaks for Europe' (they might like to start with President George W Bush who was required to meet a bewildering group of Europeans on his recent visit to Brussels all of whom claimed some sort of EU representational role) They might be both surprised and dismayed by the answers that they got and they might then be encouraged to do their best to make the new proposed arrangements work. However one suspects that the need to placate domestic electorates just to get the new Treaty ratified will itself place limits on the way that many of the member states will approach these new arrangements at least in the first instance. They will for instance be sensitive to charges that the progress that Solana is already making with plans for the EEAS as well as the establishment of the Defence Agency and the acceptance of the need for mutual assistance in the event of a terrorist attack are all taking place in defiance of the fact that the Treaty has not yet been ratified in most of the member states. In a recent article (Hannan, 2005) a British MEP argues that progress is being made towards a 'fully fledged foreign service with missions towards third countries and the un, euro ambassadors, trade attaches, a diplomatic college, the works' without 'any legal basis'. Furthermore Hannan argues that Euro-diplomats, as he refers to those who work in the Commission delegations, have already displaced the national embassies. Despite the doubts of eurosceptics, like Hannan and the 'communitaire' concerns for the role of the European Parliament and the Commission expressed by Elmar Brok there is clearly something very significant happening in the EU external relations area. Some might even argue that following on from the Single Market and the Single Currency, the EU's CFSP/ESDP is already the EU's new 'big idea – its most significant project over the next few years and far more likely to capture the public imagination than the Lisbon agenda designed to enhance European competiveness but to date a project lacking in real substance. Much will depend on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty but much has already been achieved in the external relations area in an extraordinary period since 1999; even if the Treaty is not ratified many of the external relations proposals seem likely to be implemented in some shape or form as they are supported both by the member states, the EU institutions and the EU's citizens. At the centre of this 'golden period' of CFSP/ESDP development is to be found Javier Solana who seems destined by 2009 to be regarded as having played a similar role in the evolution of the EU's external evolution to that played by Jacques Delors fifteen years earlier in the EU's internal evolution. Whilst some will doubtless focus on the EU's tendency to only progress the CFSP/ESDP in response to disasters like the response to the Yugoslavian wars or the war in Iraq others will note that Solana has had and is likely to continue to have a significant role in the progress that has been achieved. Since 1999 Solana has presided, almost single handed, over the rapid evolution of ESDP including masterminding the difficult progression of the relationship between the EU and NATO; he was appointed to 'assist the Presidency' in the CFSP but gradually he has come to replace the Presidency; he was appointed to work with the RELEX Commissioner but soon he will take over that role as the double-hatted European foreign minister; he was asked by the European Council to prepare a European Security Strategy and now for the first time the EU has a credible and comprehensive document to rationalize and to underpin its external actions; as European foreign minister-elect he has been charged with bringing forward plans both for developing the EEAS and for running the recently established European Defence Agency that seems likely to form the basis for an EU foreign ministry and as High Representative he has taken a relaxed view of the external activities of the EU 'Big Three such that he is now fully involved in them. There is a real sense in which all roads seem to lead to Solana on the CFSP/ESDP front. If he does become the first EU foreign minister then he is likely to conflict with both the Commission President and the elected President of the Council although if he gets his way with the EEAS he will have formidable back-up especially as he is likely to enjoy the support of the major EU member states for whom he can be seen as a facilitator rather than a threat. Solana's rise can also be seen against a backdrop of international developments that would seem to favour, indeed require, a growing EU role in the world. If one accepts that President Bush's new found enthusiasm for the EU 9 as suggested by his recent visit to Europe) is based on a realisation that despite its enormous military power the US finds itself in a position of weakness in its bid to preside, as the sole hyper power , over an international system that would seem to require both soft power and hard power skills and resources. If NATO is probably in terminal decline then the EU may well become the US's major interlocutor (rather than the individual EU member states) either as partner or rival but probably as a mix of both. Solana and his EEAS will not be the sole 'voice of the EU' because the major member states will continue to play a role (for instance Germany is more likely to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council than the EU) but he and his supporting officials are increasingly likely to be at the epicentre of an European Union with a significantly changed role in the world. It may well be that the need for the EU to be increasingly coherent and consistent and, above all, pro-active in international relations will be of significance in the Constitutional Treaty ratification debates in a number of EU member states. It looks though it may well matter in the future that someone 'speaks for Europe' and speaks with authority backed up by credible resources – that someone may well be Javier Solana Bibliography Bale, T (2002), Field-level CFSP: EU Diplomatic Cooperation in Third Countries', EFPU Working Papers. 1, 2002) http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU%20Working%20Paper%204.pdf Blackhurst, Rob (2004), 'Less is more in today's foreign service', Financial Times, August 27th, P.10 Bruter, M (1999), 'Diplomacy without a State: The External Delegations of the European Commission', Journal of European Public Policy, 6/2, pp.183-205 Cameron, Fraser (2004), 'Towards an EU Diplomatic Service', European Policy Centre, Commentary, July 23rd Council of Ministers (2000), The EU's External Projection: Improving the Efficiency of our Collective Resources', Paper given by Javier Solana in Evian, September, SN 1731/6.00 Council of Ministers (2004), Brussels European Council, 16.17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 16238/04 Cronin, D (2004), 'Commission plan paves way for first European foreign minister', European Voice, 10/8, p.1 Cronin, D (2005), Solana moots diplomatic service independent of the Commission, European Voice, 11/8, p.2 Crowe, B(2005) Foreign Minister of Europe, The Foreign Policy Centre Duke, Simon (2004), 'The European External Action Service: A Diplomatic Service in the Making', CFSP Forum, Volume 2, Issue 4, July, pp.4-7 Duke, Simon (2002), 'Preparing for European Diplomacy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, pp.849-869. European Parliament (2005), Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Draft Report on The institutional aspects of setting up a 'European External Action Service' (2004/2207 (IND) Grevi, G, Manca, D and Quille, G (2005), 'A Foreign Minister for the EU – Past, Present and Future' CFSP Forum. Working Paper No. 7, http://www.fornet.info/documents/Working%20Paper%20no%207.pdf Hannan, D, (2005), 'EU's 'illegal' diplomatic corps is edging out our national embassies, Sunday Telegraph, 20th March Hill, Christopher, (2003), 'A Foreign Minister without a Foreign Ministry – or with too many?', CFSP Forum, Volume 1, Issue1, pp1-2. Hocking, B and Spence, D (2002), Integrating Dilomats: EU Foreign Ministries, Palgrave Keukeleire, S (2003), 'The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and Structural Diplomacy', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 14/3, pp31-56 King, T (2004). 'Council and Commission ready for diplomatic battle', European Voice, 10/42, p.1 Merrit, G. (2004), 'Solana's role stirs up a bureaucratic turf war', International Herald Tribune, 17th December Monar, J, (2000), 'The Case for a Diplomatic Academy' European Foreign Affairs Review, 5/3,pp.281-6 Sucharipa, E (2003), '21st Century Diplomacy' Paper presented at the Wilton Park Conference on 'The Role of Diplomats in the Modern World', January 2003 Spence, David (2004), The Commission's External Service, paper presented at Conference on The Reform of EU Management: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, Aston University, 2nd July, http://www.les.Aston.ac.uk/eureformds.html Spinant, Dana (2003), 'Diplomacy on the move: are EU embassies the way ahead to forge a serious Union foreign policy?', European Voice, 6-12 March, P 11. Straw, Jack (2004), Evidence given to House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, 25 May 1